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Introduction  
Today India stands at the threshold of becoming a major economic power and a leader among 
emerging economies. Its new stature has come with certain self-imposed responsibilities, the 
foremost of which is determining how to use its new economic standing to enhance 
development. It is estimated that more than 700 million Indian citizens live in rural villages lacking 
basic amenities such as electricity and running water. A second responsibility, that is almost as 
important (albeit with an external focus), is that of being a self-appointed spokesperson for other 
emerging economies on IT policies, especially Internet policies – both national and global. These 
new responsibilities are the subject of ongoing debates in India, involving the state, industry, and 
civil society. The debates seek answers to questions such as: “How to leverage ICTs, and notably 
the Internet, for national development?” “How to effectively use global networks to enhance 
commerce?” “What sort of Internet policies will ensure unfettered and equal access to all 
citizens?” “Who should be the stakeholders in designing such policy?” “How will free and open 
access balance against security?” and “How should global Internet policy be framed to make all 
of this a reality?”  
 
Policy debates pertaining to Internet governance have assumed greater significance in recent 
years in India. The India Internet Governance Conference held on October 4-5 2012 (FICCI, 2012) 
addressed some of the above questions. It is notable that the conference was organized jointly 
by the Internet Society, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), 
and the Indian Ministry of Communications and IT, attesting to emergent multistakeholderism. 
Much of the discussion thus far has focused on the current state of Internet governance, 
problems in the current structure, and changes needed to make the Internet an equitable and 
fair platform for the development of all countries – not just those that are technologically 
advanced.  
 
In this project, we focus on Internet policy formulation in India in the context of Internet rights 
and principles, and within that, focus on security considerations. The context of reference is both 
national and global. We are interested in identifying the power brokers who set (or seek to set) 
Indian Internet policy, understanding their influences, both internal and external, and analyzing 
how national security considerations affect Internet policies. This approach enables us to discuss 
wider global and domestic Internet governance interactions and their impact on Indian policy-
making that pertains to security issues.  
Why study India? Motivations and Significance 
The evolution of Internet policy formulation in India thus far is interesting for many reasons. To 
date, India’s Internet policy has included elements of different modes of governance, and some 
of its positions have been contradictory. At times, the Indian government has advocated top-
down or UN-based control, whereas at other times it has supported a multistakeholder approach 
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(Denardis, 2014). In September 2011, India, along with Brazil and South Africa, met at Rio de 
Janeiro (the “IBSA” Summit) and agreed on the idea of a United Nations organization that would 
deal with Internet governance issues. At the 66th session of the UN General Assembly (in 
September 2011), the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh proposed the creation of a UN 
committee to manage the Internet, its standards bodies and policy organizations, treaties, and 
disputes. This attempt to shift Internet control to the UN was roundly opposed by the United 
States and the European Union. Recently, India has made an about-turn, joining the United States 
and the European Union by resisting a top-down governmental approach for global Internet 
governance. In 2012 at the World Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT) in 
Dubai, India sided with the EU and US in support for the multistakeholder status quo. In doing so, 
India made clear its opposition to the approach proposed by some governments, including those 
of China, Iran, and Russia, which has called into question the multistakeholder model of Internet 
governance and advocated for more control by national governments. Since then, India has 
supported multistakeholderism in global meetings on Internet governance. Despite this support 
for multistakeholderism abroad, India’s domestic record shows willingness by the government to 
act against the desires of internal and external stakeholders who favor an open Internet. Pro-free 
speech groups such as the Index on Censorship have scrutinized India’s domestic record (Patry, 
2013). Jyoti Panday of the Center for Internet and Society (CIS-India), a Bangalore based NGO, 
writes that 143 URLs have been blocked by the Department of Electronics and Information 
Technology in 2015 alone, stating that the procedure for blocking content remains opaque in 
India (Panday, 2015).  Given this inconsistency in global and domestic actions, we ask: what 
power dynamics exert influence over Internet governance in India? 
  
Several features of India’s Internet make it significant for policymaking and for scholars studying 
global Internet governance. First, after a late start, India is now home to a large and rapidly 
growing Internet market. Although a relatively small percentage of citizens (15.1% in 2013) have 
access to the Internet, that nevertheless gives India the third largest number (185+ million) of 
users, after China and the United States (International Telecommunications Union, 2013). In the 
years to come, India’s number of users will continue to grow dramatically. Cisco’s Visual 
Networking Index estimates that the country’s IP traffic will grow five-fold from 2013 to 2018, at 
a compound annual growth rate of 39%, reaching 3.6 exabytes per month in 2018, up from 680 
petabytes per month in 2013 (Cisco Visual Networking Index, 2014). 
  
Second, India’s Internet infrastructure will expand and improve. Two major factors include the 
continued growth of mobile Internet in India (with most service offered by the private sector) 
and the National Optical Fibre Network (managed by the Bharat Broadband Network Ltd, a 
government-owned special purpose vehicle). These infrastructural improvements will allow for 
more users to access the Internet and for greater transmission speeds. What remains to be seen 
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is how effectively they will reduce the urban-rural divide in Internet access as well as help 
advance India’s larger developmental goals. 
  
Third, in part to encourage rural users, the Indian government is undertaking major efforts in e-
governance. According to the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA), India’s National 
e-governance Program (NeGP) is “one of the most ambitious in the world” (Institute for Defense 
Studies and Analysis, 2012: 20).  The initiative seeks to bring more than 1,200 services online and 
encourage effective use of networks to relay data for communication purposes and for 
commercial transactions. The program involves major sectors such as Defense, Energy, Finance, 
Land Records, Law Enforcement, Public Essential Services, Security, Space, Telecommunications, 
Transport, and Utilities. 
  
The growth of Indian Internet usage has often outpaced efforts to protect its infrastructure and 
users. One fundamental vulnerability is India’s dependence on a few submarine cables that 
transmit substantial amounts of data. In 2008 and 2011, users in India suffered major loss of 
access as a result of cuts to cables under the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf.2 In contrast to trans-
Atlantic and trans-Pacific Internet traffic, data bound to or from India must pass through a 
handful of minimally protected cables, which (as happened 2008 and 2011) can be severed by 
underwater landslides or an errant ship’s anchor. 
  
Other, larger vulnerabilities to the Indian Internet involve malicious activity by users inside and 
outside the country. In recent years, an underground economy has flourished on India’s Internet, 
thanks to low levels of computer security (Dharmakumar, 2011). Some estimates show that India 
is the world’s third-largest generator of spam zombies and a major source of phishing hosts 
(Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 2012: 23-24). India’s experience has also shown that 
its Internet infrastructure is unprepared to deal with sophisticated computer worms and other 
malware. Although Iranian nuclear infrastructure was the target of the 2010 Stuxnet attack, India 
suffered significant collateral damage, with more than 10,000 Indian computers, including 15 in 
critical infrastructure facilities, affected by the computer worm (Fitter, 2012). In addition, cyber-
attacks and counterattacks by India and Pakistan (perpetrated by groups such as the Indian Cyber 
Army and Pakistan Cyber Army) have become routine events in recent years (Dilipraj, 2013). 
These have added impetus to arguments that national security considerations will have to be a 
big part of any Internet policy.  
 
                                               
2 For a map of the world’s major submarine cables and the 2008 cable cuts, see: The Guardian (2008). “The 
Internet’s Undersea World.” Available at: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
images/Technology/Pix/pictures/2008/02/01/SeaCableHi.jpg 
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Research Questions and Methods 
Our objective is to explain transformations in Internet governance in India in terms of interactions 
among global and domestic players, civil society, private interests, and technological 
infrastructure. We explore the interactions that produce Internet policy in India, emphasizing the 
relationship between security and Internet rights and principles. We study inside and outside 
interactions – including those among civil society, political and regulatory bodies, Internet service 
providers (ISPs), content providers, transnational governance bodies and users – and these 
actors’ influence on global meetings such as the IGF. Civil society in India, despite its nascent 
state, is beginning to play an important role as an arbiter of Internet policy debates, especially 
on the issue of Internet rights and freedoms accorded to citizens. Therefore, we focus our 
interviews primarily on civil society players and, to a lesser extent, on representatives from the 
industry and academic communities. The historical discussion and governmental views have 
been excerpted from published policy papers and reports. 
  
Our analysis thus keeps in mind historical developments that have shaped Internet policy, modes 
of governance, and civil society. In recent years, India’s government has realized both the 
popularity and disruptive potential of the Internet, especially social media. Accordingly it has 
pursued a mixed set of policies intended to balance technological development with social 
harmony. We consider the complex set of interactions that have shaped policy, the ways that 
macro shifts in culture, politics, economics, and institutions have changed the nature and scale 
of these interactions, and the implications that these interactions have for future policy 
frameworks. We believe that these interactions have important ramifications for India’s Internet 
policy as well as for other emerging economies (particularly heterogeneous societies) and, more 
broadly, for global governance of a shared resource. Accordingly, our research focuses on these 
interactions by examining three questions: (1) What tensions among state, technology, and 
market forces shape India’s Internet policy? (2) What effects do external influences such as global 
associations, multilateral meetings, and global political dynamics have on shaping India’s Internet 
policy? (3) What are the trends resulting from this combination of existing policies and global 
forces? 
  
In what follows, we present the results of our study in three parts. In the first part, we present a 
historical analysis of the political economy of telecommunications in India after independence. 
We discuss how India gradually recognized the importance of the Internet and the country’s 
attempts to increase its presence in international forums pertaining to Internet governance. We 
then trace the evolution of civil society in India and discuss multistakeholderism in an Indian 
context.  
 
 6 
INTERACTIONS AND POLICY-MAKING – NOVEMBER 2015 
In the second part, we discuss our study of legislation and policy documents that tell the early 
story of India’s domestic Internet policies and the country’s role in global Internet governance. 
Multiple laws and policies have shaped security and Internet freedom-related debates in India 
(Prakash, 2013).  We have focused on India’s Information Technology Act (2000) in its original 
and amended forms, and the notifications and charter of the Computer Emergency Response-in 
India (CERT-In). In our analysis of these documents, we seek to historically construct Internet 
governance since 2008, focusing on security and Internet rights and principles issues. Together, 
these documents show the growth and evolution of India’s domestic Internet policies, and the 
relationship between wider political events, especially the Mumbai terrorist attacks of 2006, and 
government policies. 
 
In the third part, we discuss the results of a set of semi-structured interviews with civil society 
stakeholders. Our sample was purposive, since we selected interviewees who are directly 
involved with the issues of security and Internet rights. We asked respondents to discuss (a) 
background information on their role in global/national Internet governance, security and 
Internet rights and principles, (b) their motivations for change in security and Internet rights as 
well as their principles and potential motivation for changes since 2008, and (c) examples of 
changes in Internet governance and the role of civil society in making those changes. The 
rationale behind those questions was to analyze the social dynamics that have shaped global and 
national Internet governance since 2008. 
 
Each of these three components contributes to the paper’s overriding goal: to understand the 
complex interactions that shape Internet governance in India. By studying the history and 
political economy of telecommunications in India, we can understand how rapidly and 
profoundly India’s telecommunications sector has grown since the 1990s, and the type of 
challenges that have faced policymakers. And by studying India’s Internet policies, we can 
understand both the factors - technical, economic and political - that influenced policies, as well 
as the ways that early legislation on a nascent Internet had effects later on. Last, by speaking to 
civil society groups involved in the policymaking process, we are able to understand the nature 
of multistakeholderism in India, the shifting power dynamics, and what is at stake in Internet 
governance interactions. The paper is thus more than an analysis of Internet policy itself; it is an 
effort to understand the origins of a policy framework and the implications of that framework for 
privacy, security, freedom of speech, and democratic participation.  
 
1. Telecommunications in Post-Independence India: A Brief History 
To fully understand India’s Internet governance debates and stances, we need to understand the 
development of communication technologies and policies in India throughout the last three 
decades. From its independence in 1947 until economic liberalization (which tentatively started 
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in 1984) in 1991, India followed the mantra of socialistic self-reliance. Central planning, large 
state-run enterprises, and stringent import restrictions on technology characterized this period. 
Economic and technological growth was choked by post-colonial policies built from a deep 
mistrust of the capitalist, colonial system (Subramanian, 2006). This had a major effect in limiting 
the country’s telecommunications development. From 1947 until 1985, Indian 
telecommunications was controlled by the state monopoly PTT (Posts, Telegraphs and 
Telecommunications Department). Research was virtually non-existent and telephones were 
considered a privilege rather than a right. Public opinion and interests were not worthy of 
consideration. A graphic example of this callous attitude is a 1984 exchange in the Indian 
Parliament between an opposition member and C.M. Stephen, Minister of Communications in 
Indira Gandhi’s government. When the opposition member questioned the poor quality of 
telecommunications service provided by the government monopoly, the Minister,  
 
…replied in a lordly manner that telephones were a luxury in a developing country, 
that the government had no obligation to provide them or improve the service, 
and that if the honorable member didn’t like his telephone, he could return it, 
because there was an eight-year-long waiting list of people to get landlines. 
(Tharoor, 2007) 
 
Relief arrived in 1991 when the Indian government, faced with a severe balance of payments 
crisis, was forced to borrow from the IMF, with attendant conditions. One of the conditions 
required the liberalization of its economy, and the Narasimha Rao government was forced to 
adhere. In the years afterward, economic liberalization resulted in impressive GDP growth rates 
of around 9% per year and has remained strong even after the global economic downturn in 2008 
(Subramanian, 2011a). The growth has been spearheaded by the IT and software industry. The 
Global Technology Services sector has successfully weathered global uncertainties, and its 
revenues for the financial year 2015 is expected to cross the landmark figure of 150 billion USD. 
This sector represented almost 9.5% of India’s GDP in 2014, and has played a substantial role in 
India’s development over the last two decades (NASSCOM, 2015). 
 
In 1998, the Indian government realized that it needed to take drastic steps to enhance the 
country’s IT infrastructure and take advantage of the then-nascent Internet. Prime Minister Atal 
Behari Vajpayee set up a multistakeholder National Task Force on IT and Software Development 
whose goal was to develop ideas and strategies to make India an IT superpower and one of the 
world’s largest generators and exporters of software in ten years (i.e. 2008). The task force 
members consisted of government officials and select representatives from the IT industry and a 
couple of educational institutions. No general members of the public or NGOs were involved (NIC, 
1998). The task force collected ideas and suggestions that became the basis for an “Information 
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Technology Action Plan.” This plan eventually led to the passage of the IT Act of 2000. The IT Act 
of 2000 followed the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the UN Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which provides legal recognition of electronic documents 
and digital signatures, addresses offenses, contraventions, and cybercrimes – all of which were 
pertinent to Internet-based commerce. The Act covers cyber offenses committed against 
individuals (e.g. distribution of obscene material, harassment, hacking, transmitting viruses, and 
network trespassing), organizations (e.g. possessing unauthorized information, cyber-terrorism, 
and distribution of pirated software), and society at large (e.g. pornography, trafficking, and 
corrupting young people). The law applied to any computer user in India, as well as to persons in 
other countries who commit crimes using computers or networks located within India (IT Act of 
2000). 
 
India and Internet Governance 
Recognizing the geopolitical importance of the Internet, the Indian state has for the last decade 
and a half sought to increase its presence in international forums on Internet governance. The 
government as well as civil society (represented by NGOs) participated in the WSIS in Geneva 
(2003) and Tunis (2005). At WSIS-Tunis, the original agenda – to address the digital divide and 
human rights issues among nation states – was quickly overshadowed by calls for a more 
democratic way to frame Internet policies and governance issues through an UN-based Internet 
Governance Forum. Paragraph 72 of the Tunis Agenda mandated the UN Secretary-General to 
convene a forum to conduct multistakeholder policy discussions (P.J. Singh, 2008). The process 
was initiated through the creation of the Working Group for Internet Governance (WGIG), which 
eventually led to the creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The Indian government 
supported this, and Indian NGOs such as IT for Change played a major role in the initial formation 
of the IGF. Parminder Singh of IT for Change and Nitin Desai, an Indian career bureaucrat, initially 
took on the role of special advisors to the IGF Chair. 
 
Over the years since the inception of the IGF, the Indian government’s position has generally 
coincided with the position of many Indian NGOs, especially their suspicion of the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The Indian government and Indian NGOs 
held a shared suspicion that ICANN, which governed the operational aspects of the Internet, 
remains under the influence of the US government. There was belief in the notion that ICANN, 
being a US-registered corporation, was beholden to the US Department of Commerce and US 
laws, and thus was not an appropriate neutral entity that could be trusted with the governance 
the global Internet (Joshi, 2013; Kaul, 2014). Indian NGOs were resentful of US attempts to 
categorize the role of ICANN as purely “esoteric,” technical and research-oriented in nature, 
focused on smooth functioning of the Internet (and the stability, security, and robustness of the 
infrastructure), and the insinuation that developing countries would be better off by just 
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“consuming” the Internet and focusing on building applications to suit their development 
agenda. A research paper from an Indian NGO at the first IGF conference focused primarily on 
how Internet governance should be moved away from ICANN, on the grounds that it was under 
the control of US government and business interests, and “rich country clubs” such as the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (P. J. Singh, 2008). The Indian 
government made several statements to the effect that while it was generally satisfied with the 
status-quo regarding Internet operations, it preferred that ICANN’s work be performed by an UN-
based organization that had multistakeholder membership, which could then bring the views and 
development imperatives of the (UN) member states to the table. This is evident from Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh’s address at the 66th UN General Council meeting in September 2011 
favoring moving ICANN under the authority of the UN, an idea that resulted from the IBSA 
meeting of 2011 (as noted in an earlier section). India’s position was firmly opposed by the EU, 
the US, and other OECD members. The US justified its position on the basis that such a move 
would lead to more governmental control, which would result in censorship of the Internet in 
several countries with poor human rights records. 
 
Internet Free Speech and Security Considerations 
While India has a record as a strong democracy that protects free expression in its law and 
constitution,3 its record on Internet free speech has nevertheless been uneven. As early as 2003, 
India designated the Department of Telecommunications as the single authority to order blocks 
on certain sites and issued a notification on July 7, 2003, stating that “websites promoting hate 
content, slander or defamation of others, promoting gambling, promoting racism, violence and 
terrorism and other such material, in addition to promoting pornography, including child 
pornography and violent sex can reasonably be blocked” (Ministry of Communication and 
Information Technology, 2003a). A 2007 report by the OpenNet Initiative4 tested several Internet 
service providers in India and found evidence of government filtering of sites whose contents 
related to national unity or national security (OpenNet, 2007). India also has a history of overt 
censorship and blocking of sites. Examples include: the blocking of all Yahoo Groups in September 
2003 after Yahoo refused to block access to the group Kynhun, which promoted the secession of 
Meghalaya from India; the blocking of the extremist web site www.hinduunity.org in April 2004; 
and the blocking of seventeen web sites, including blog sites, after the 2006 Mumbai bombings 
(Sengupta, 2006). 
  
                                               
3 Article 19 of the Indian Constitution protects freedom of speech and expression. Article 19. (1)(a) states that “All 
citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression.” Available at: http://lawmin.nic.in.  
4 The OpenNet Initiative is a collaborative project, involving several major Internet research centers, to monitor 
and report surveillance activity by national governments. 
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Government attempts to filter and block sites have continued despite changes in governments 
and prime ministers. The media and some civil society activists have usually met such initiatives 
with strong resistance. These groups argue that the Indian government has played a double 
game: on the one hand, the government was pushing back on what it considered the overt 
influence on the Internet by US tech companies and the US government. On the other hand, the 
government was attempting to control free speech on the Internet. Over time, NGOs began to 
realize that with respect to Internet governance, the Indian government was more interested in 
promoting multilateral agreements (at a country-country level) rather than multistakeholder 
agreements, which would include a variety of domestic stakeholders (including civil society). 
 
The impact of the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks effectively nullified growing opposition to the 
government’s approach. In the weeks that followed, Indian lawmakers hurriedly passed the 
Amendment to the IT Act of 2000 with little debate or opposition from civil society (Subramanian, 
2011). The Amended Act (under sections 66-69) listed a host of actions that would be deemed 
computer-based crimes. That same year, speaking at the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in 
Hyderabad, Jainder Singh, Secretary of the Department of Information Technology, described the 
Internet as both “a vehicle” to enhance communication and “a target of criminal minds” (Moody, 
2011). NGOs such as the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS-India) and the People’s Union for 
Civil Liberties (PUCL) opposed these moves, saying that the Amendments were an attack on 
Freedom of Speech and amounted to censorship (Prakash, 2012). In the ensuing years, India has 
experienced increased debate on whether unfettered Internet access poses a threat to security, 
and on the kind of governance that would provide the right balance of access and security. Much 
of this debate plays out in the media and through opinions and position papers from civil society 
NGOs. However, the number of NGOs involved in the Internet governance debate is still 
extremely small, and the influence they exert is uneven. Sivasubramanian Muthuswamy, 
President of the Internet Society (ISOC) of India – Chennai Chapter, stated in an interview that 
the number of NGOs involved in Internet governance and Internet policy issues numbered less 
than ten, and that there was not a significant and consistent civil society-led movement on 
Internet issues in India at present. In looking at the role of civil society in influencing Indian 
Internet policy issues it is useful to examine the history and evolution of civil society in India. 
 
The Evolution of Civil Society in India 
Political scientists studying the development of state and civil society in India have noted 
significant differences between this growth in India and similar developments in the West. In the 
case of Western Europe, the state and civil society developed both independently and parallel to 
each other over a long period, during which both the state and civil society became stronger, 
more efficient, and independent of each other. The Indian case, as noted by Henrik Berglund 
(2009), has been different. Both in the pre-colonial and colonial period, the state in India always 
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co-existed with traditional religious power structures. The British colonizers realized this and 
divided the population according to religion, and ruled by cultivating and co-opting religious 
elites. This led to a strengthening of religious identity as well as a strengthening of the power 
held by religious elites (Belair-Gagnon et al., 2014; Freitag, 1989, p. 109). 
 
The beginnings of contemporary Indian civil society can be traced to the early years of the 20th 
century and the emergence of the Indian National Congress. Under the Indian National Congress, 
intellectuals united to form a cohesive unit opposed to British rule, bringing together Indians of 
different faiths and social strata. The Indian National Congress, while fundamentally focused on 
freedom from British rule, also facilitated within its ambit movements such as the women’s 
movement, labor movement, and other social reform movements. For many of these 
movements, the political sphere as well as the economic sphere served as their raison d'être, as 
restrictive British laws and taxes had suffocated the domestic industry and damaged prospects 
for economic development. 
 
In this nascent Indian civil society, many of the bourgeoisie who participated in the movement 
were also the same people who were under British employment, as managers, lawyers, and 
teachers. Thus, an uncomfortable and unspoken nexus between the state and civil society existed 
in the early days of India’s civil society. The first Indian trade union, the All India Trade Union 
Congress (AITUC) formed in 1920, was an early effort to organize a section of Indian society 
outside of the influence of the state and capital owners. It became an important instrument for 
enhancing the awareness of the labor class, and also served as a “rudimentary civil society” 
(Berglund, 2009). 
 
After independence, the Indian government set up a Planning Commission that established five-
year plans for the country’s political and economic development. Thus, even after independence, 
the economy was dominated by the state. During the 1960s, however, the country’s mostly 
agricultural economy suffered several setbacks due to droughts, a resulting food crisis, and wars 
with China and Pakistan in 1962 and 1965, respectively. These crises helped vitalize the labor 
movement, which was joined by both urban and rural groups in a series of protests.  
 
Contemporary Indian civil society had its beginnings during the “Emergency” (from 1975 to 1977) 
when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared that escalating civil and political unrest had created 
dangerous destabilization. Upon her advice, the President of India declared an emergency, which 
gave the Prime Minister the power to rule by decree, subverting many fundamental rights of 
Indian citizens. Civil, political and legal rights were severely curtailed. The Emergency became the 
basis for the rise of numerous protest movements and a reemergence of civil society groups in 
the late 1970s and 1980s. These groups comprised a cross-section of civilians including workers, 
 12 
INTERACTIONS AND POLICY-MAKING – NOVEMBER 2015 
academics, students, and peasants. Other groups that formed during this period and focused on 
specific agendas, such as the Hindu nationalists, environmental groups, and women’s rights 
organizations, gained strength during this period. 
 
Another boost for civil society came with the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-1997), which allocated 
funds for NGOs. The state realized that NGOs were better and more successful at reaching and 
providing many types of required services to the population. Some commentators such as Lucy 
Dubochet believe that this was the start of the “NGOization” of civil society in India, and resulted 
in the dramatic growth of NGOs operating in India (Dubochet, 2012). As NGOs grew in number 
and size, they came to depend increasingly on external agencies for funding. Some of these 
agencies were Indian, while many were from outside of India. Significant state funding also 
strengthened the dependent relationship between the state and civil society. 
 
Amir Ali notes another important aspect of the evolution of Indian civil society, which he refers 
to as the separation of the public and private sphere (Ali, 2001). The British found it expedient to 
rule through representative governance by separating the religious groups (mainly Hindu and 
Muslim) and dealing only with representatives of these groups. Two types of laws were created 
– one for the public sphere (i.e. governance, land and commercial dealings, etc.) and one strictly 
for the private sphere (i.e. separate personal laws for Muslims and Hindus governing family 
issues, marital relationships, inheritance, codes of conduct, etc.). This system has persisted over 
time, through the nationalist movement, up to the present. Thus, there is a common view that 
civil society does not address the concerns of all communities equally. Minority concerns (i.e. 
non-Hindu, women, and lower castes) are not adequately represented, and minority opinions are 
not easily accepted. Today’s NGOs, while purporting to represent multiple stakeholders, may 
actually, and at times inadvertently, be addressing only the concerns of the majority populations 
(or the elites) that they represent.  
 
This historiography of Indian civil society provides a context to the presence, activities, and 
perceived role and effectiveness of civil society in India. This history is especially useful in 
understanding civil society’s values, views on multistakeholderism, and its relationships with the 
state as well as industry. This also sets up the context for a discussion on civil society’s 
interactions with government and industry with regard to the Internet governance process in 
India.     
 
Multistakeholderism in an Indian Context 
“Multistakeholderism” in Internet governance generally refers to interactions across technical 
developers, private sector providers, civil society, and governments as opposed to top-down 
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governance.5 For example, ICANN’s stated mission is to: “bring together the primary stakeholders 
such as businesses, civil society, governments, research institutions and non-government 
organizations to cooperate and participate in the dialogue, decision making and implementation 
of solutions to common problems or goals” (ICANN, 2014). 
  
Until recently, the term ‘multistakeholderism’ in the Indian context has mostly meant some ad 
hoc combination of representation from the state, corporate interests (i.e. industry), civil society 
(mostly well-established NGOs), and academics. In practice, this idea of multistakeholderism can 
be seen in the composition of the National Task Force on IT and Software Development set up by 
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in 1998. As noted earlier, this task force primarily consisted 
of government officials and select representatives from the IT industry and a couple of 
educational institutions—members of the public or people from NGOs were not included (NIC, 
1998).  
 
Frequently, interviewees highlighted the social and economic context in which the Internet has 
developed in India. Parminder Singh of IT for Change noted that issues in Internet policy were 
different in India when compared to the West. Singh agreed that concepts such as free speech, 
free trade, and an uncensored Internet (concepts championed by the West) were laudable. 
However, he also commented that the West has become somewhat “mono-focused” (i.e. having 
a singular approach) on these issues. This, he felt, did not leave much scope for different 
interpretations and prioritizations of policy in other nations, especially in developing countries. 
 
Samir Saran and William Poff-Webster (2014) reach a similar conclusion. In their analysis, the 
services expected by the poorest citizens used to be bijli, sadak, and paani (electricity, roads, and 
water). However, these needs are now rapidly changing to bijli, sadak, paani, and Internet. The 
original needs remain, but they have been augmented by the need for Internet. NGOs such as IT 
for Change, CIS-India, and The Centre for Communication Governance are advocating for more 
participation in Internet policy discussions by various segments of the population, making the 
process much more multi-stakeholder oriented.  
 
When it comes to the question of Internet rights and principles, there has been tension in the 
relationship among the multistakeholder approach, national security interests, and Internet 
rights. This has been debated in India frequently since the terrorist attack of 2008. The debate 
has focused on surveillance, privacy, and government access to individual online data (discussed 
in an earlier section). While these debates are not new in the global context, as noted earlier, 
                                               
5 India’s UN-CIRP (Committee for Internet-related Policies) proposal was rejected by several countries including the 
US. The countries that rejected the proposal claimed that this committee would pass control of the Internet to the 
UN. 
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Indian civil society’s involvement in Internet policies has been relatively recent (within the last 
decade). Civil society has become vocal in stating its opinions on domestic issues such as 
surveillance of Indian citizens and censorship, as well as net neutrality. 
 
The Indian government has reacted to civil society advocacy by attempting to frame Internet 
policies. While acknowledging these moves, many of our civil society interviewees noted that 
government efforts at engagement have not resulted in civil society gaining greater influence in 
the formation of Internet policies. At the same time, it has also become clear that the Indian 
government has started to play a more active role in international Internet governance 
discussions. The government has been gradually verbalizing its own views and seeking 
multilateral alliances with a few other countries.  
 
Typically, Indian NGOs involved are funded by a variety of sources: charitable trusts located in 
India; the state; UN agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF and UNESCO; and foreign aid agencies such 
as the IDRC (Canada), Sigrid Rausing Trust (UK), Kusuma Trust (UK) and others. Given the varied 
funding sources, it is prudent to examine if and how donors might influence the NGOs’ views, 
especially with respect to multistakeholderism. Our interviewees were specifically asked about 
this. Their overall responses indicate that the source of funding did not significantly influence 
their objectives as facilitators of greater multistakeholder participation in the Internet policy-
making process. One interviewee specifically noted that over the last few years, there has been 
a profusion of international funding for Internet Governance to NGOs. However, some NGOs 
have balked at such funding, because, as noted earlier, of the narrow and “mono-focused” 
interests of the funding agencies. Parminder Singh noted that such a straight-jacket approach 
would not work in India, with its plurality of interests. With respect to government monies 
influencing NGO interests, Singh noted that government funding often came from states that 
were run by different political parties that were not aligned to the central government, and were 
often focused on their own narrow interests, such as rural education and empowerment of 
women, etc. Thus, their influence on other related policies such as Internet Governance was 
minimal if not non-existent.  
 
It is not surprising that civil society organizations argue that they choose their own destinies and 
are not the proxies of benefactors (domestic or foreign). In fairness to these organizations, they 
must raise money from somewhere, and the growth in funding for civil society indicates several 
trends. One trend is that Indian civil society has reached a level of sophistication that 
international donors have taken notice. A related trend is that India has become a crucial market 
in online commerce and other aspects of Internet usage and, as a result, the expertise Indian civil 
society organizations offer is essential in discussions about privacy and security (and a host of 
other issues). More broadly, the growth in funding for Indian civil society organizations allows us 
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to reflect on multistakeholder Internet governance. Multistakeholderism is complex process, 
with alliances that cross borders, involve different types of organizations, and link countries rich 
and poor, large and small. Increasingly, these alliances defy the tidy categories of 'government', 
'industry', and 'civil society' that have framed much of the thinking and discussion about 
multistakeholder governance. 
 
This section has discussed the growth of India’s telecommunication sector and the involvement 
of civil society organizations in the Internet governance process. This history is prologue for the 
next section, which examines the legislation and policy documents pertaining to Indian Internet 
policy. In that section, we show the ways that civil society became involved in the Internet 
governance process, first as opponents to certain provisions in the IT Act and later as sources of 
expertise, proponents of certain policies, and active players in a process that has expanded to 
include a wider range of stakeholders. 
 
2. Internet Legislation and Policy in India 
The starting point for this policy history is the Information Technology Act (2000), the first 
comprehensive piece of legislation in India on e-commerce and cybercrimes. The Act provides 
for “the legal recognition of transactions carried out by ... alternatives to paper-based methods 
of communication and storage of information” (Indian Parliament, 2000). The IT Act’s main 
actions included legally recognizing electronic records and communications, creating a regulation 
framework for Certiﬁcation Authorities (i.e. the entities that issue digital certificates), and cyber 
contraventions (i.e. acts that violate cyber laws prevailing in a jurisdiction, but not considered 
criminal - thus they may lead to civil prosecutions, but not criminal prosecutions) (Blythe, 2006). 
The Indian government’s decision to pass the IT Act followed initiatives by the United Nations 
and by other Asian governments. In their assessment of the law five years after its passage, Basu 
and Jones write: “The Act is based on the Model Law on E-Commerce adopted by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and no doubt was prompted by the 
passing of such legislation by neighboring countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia” (Basu and 
Jones, 2005: 210). 
  
The IT Act of 2000 was a far-reaching document, meant to cover a wide range of activities, and 
written with the expectation that the Internet would grow and evolve. In subsequent years the 
Act has faced criticism for being too expansive and for undermining privacy and free speech 
(Holder and Grimes, 2006). For an example of its expansiveness, see Section 2 (1) (o), which 
defines data in very broad terms by including all kinds of personal, banking, financial, confidential 
health, and insurance related data (Dugal, 2008). The only safeguard that the IT Act of 2000 
provides to data is with respect to the penalty in cases of breach or unlawful activity (Bharadwaj, 
2010). 
 16 
INTERACTIONS AND POLICY-MAKING – NOVEMBER 2015 
  
Three years after passing the IT Act, the Indian government formalized its process for blocking 
websites. In important “Notifications” in 2003 and 2004, the government established the 
Computer Emergency Response-in India (CERT-In) and the procedure for blocking of websites. 
According to the Ministry of Telecommunications notification dated February 27, 2003:  
 
India (CERT-In) shall be the single authority for issue of instructions in the context 
of blocking of websites. CERT-In, after verifying the authenticity of the complaint 
and after satisfying that action of blocking of website is absolutely essential, shall 
instruct Department of Telecommunications (DOT) - (LR Cell) to block the website. 
DOT, under whose control the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are functioning will 
ensure the blocking of websites and inform CERT-In accordingly. (Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology, 2003b) 
  
CERT-In subsequently established a charter and released statistics on the organization’s efforts. 
The charter provides a national mandate for the agency:  
 
The purpose of CERT-In is to become the nation’s most trusted referral agency of 
the Indian community for responding to computer security incidents as and when 
they occur; the CERT-In will also assist members of the Indian Community in 
implementing proactive measures to reduce the risks of computer security 
incidents. (CERT-In, 2015) 
 
In 2010, CERT-In published statistics showing that the majority of computer security incidents 
handled (61%) concerned “website compromise and malware propagation,” vastly eclipsing the 
second-largest component, virus/malicious code at 27% of incidents (CERT-In, 2010). 
  
In the years since its creation, CERT-In has expanded and clarified its role as the national 
coordinating body for government blocking of websites. But its role has limits: According to Lallie, 
CERT-In “generally does not get involved in digital forensic investigation” (Lallie, 2012: 3). 
However, after the Mumbai attacks, this limitation was laid bare. It became clear that there was 
no specific agency charged with conducting digital forensic investigations, nor was such an entity 
legally sanctioned or able to identify and recognize an impending attack. 
  
In 2008, the IT Act was substantially amended to give the government new powers of 
investigation. Some of these changes focused on digital forensics. For example, previously, 
Section 78 of the Act had stated that the investigation and recording of a statement of offences 
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committed under the act must be carried out by “a police ofﬁcer not below the rank of Deputy 
Superintendent of Police” (Indian Parliament, 2000). But as Lallie notes:  
A Deputy Superintendent of Police … is often not available at smaller police 
stations which in turn limits the locations and opportunities at which a cybercrime 
could be reported. Section 78 was revised in the amendment such that an 
inspector was now able to receive and investigate an act of cybercrime. The act is 
therefore less restrictive and potentially allows cybercrimes (in theory at least) to 
be reported and investigated by any police station. (Lallie, 2012: 7) 
  
While the amended IT Act extended into cyber law, it did not address several important issues, 
including: payment, copyright, media convergence, cyber-squatting, and questions of 
jurisdiction. As Internet usage in India continues to grow, the Act’s limitations will require further 
amendments. Today, the dissemination of computer viruses, hacking, and denial of service 
attacks are major problems for corporate houses, service providers, and users (Ahmad, 2010). 
  
In addition to large-scale legislative changes, the Indian government has also undertaken ad hoc 
policies in response to specific concerns and threats. In April 2011, new laws extended the scope 
of Internet surveillance to cybercafés through “Cyber Cafes Rules.” Under these rules, Indian 
mobile phone users must register their names and provide a copy of government-issued ID to 
activate SIM cards. Additionally, Internet service providers are required to grant government 
authorities access to users’ data (Acharya, 2011). In June 2013, The Hindu revealed significant 
domestic surveillance and an absence of a legal or procedural framework to protect privacy 
online (S. Singh, 2013). Section 69 of the IT Act gives the state surveillance powers in the interest 
of national security or “friendly relations with foreign states” (Indian Parliament, 2008). In these 
initiatives, the Indian government has attempted a difficult balancing act. Kapil Sibal, the Minister 
of Communications and Information Technology, has stated that India believes in “complete 
freedom of the Internet” but at the same time “needs to acknowledge that along with cyber 
freedoms come cyber gangsters, and the state and its citizens need to be protected from them” 
(Kaul, 2013). 
  
With Indian internet governance still evolving, civil society actors have stepped up, offering 
technical and legal expertise with the goal to influence government policy. Indian NGOs have also 
stepped up their presence in national and international forums on Internet policy, such as the 
India Internet Governance Conference (New Delhi, 2012) and several IGF meetings. Some have 
joined international coalitions such as The Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition 
(IRPDC), an open network at the IGF. This coalition promotes “an equal right to access and use a 
secure and open Internet” (Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition, 2015). A recent 
example of such NGO participation is the Internet Democracy Project’s participation in the 
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“Global Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration for Achieving a Safe, Secure, and Tolerant Cyberspace,” 
a meeting held on the sidelines of the IGF in Bali on October 21, 2013. Several NGOs were also 
present at the NETmundial Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet 
Governance, held April 23-24, 2014 in São Paulo, Brazil.  
 
At domestic and especially international fora, Indian civil society organizations have become 
active participants in discussions related to Internet governance. In this new activism, we can 
identify a set of capacities as well as limitations on the change that civil society can actualize 
practice. To date, civil society organizations have played roles as experts on technical and legal 
details, and as representatives for a range of interests beyond those of the government and 
major commercial players. Civil society organizations have established their place in a process of 
consultation that governments have generally respected, if at times half-heartedly. In the case of 
India, while civil society organizations have not always been happy with government policies on 
the Internet (or, more broadly, telecommunications), these organizations have been able to 
scrutinize these policies and have, in some cases managed to effect changes in policy. But as civil 
society organizations themselves admit, their powers are limited in the present multistakeholder 
process. While they can offer expertise, promote transparency, scrutinize legislation, and criticize 
action; civil society organizations cannot set a legislative agenda (as governments can) and they 
do not represent a large economic sector (as the tech industry does). As a result, civil society 
organizations must deploy their limited resources in ways that make the most impact. The third 
section of this paper examines the interactions civil society organizations undertake in promoting 
security and Internet rights. 
 
3. Interactions and Influences in Policymaking 
We interviewed members of civil society organizations involved in India’s Internet governance 
debates. In our interviews with civil society players, we asked interviewees to discuss their 
experiences dealing with security issues, and in participating in discussions (in India and at global 
meetings) on how to protect security and Internet rights. Our analysis of the interviews revealed 
four common themes: (1) a desire for a broader understanding of ‘security’ in policy, (2) 
encouragement of greater emphasis on users’ rights, (3) worries about sovereignty and lobbying 
by US technology giants, and (4) suggestions that the government improve technical knowledge 
among policymakers and judges. In this section, we discuss each of these themes in turn. 
  
Understanding ‘Security’ Policy 
Several interviewees criticized government definitions of security as too narrow and overly 
focused on government priorities (at the expense of users’ rights). Rishab Bailey, Legal Consultant 
to the Society for Knowledge Commons, stated: “We see security as a broad issue, not just the 
specific issue like ‘is your data being stolen?’ or ‘the fight against terrorism.’ So we would look at 
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it as a matter of economic independence or dependence, looking at security of user data.”  Also 
calling for a broadening of the concept of security was Anja Kovacs, Director of the Internet 
Democracy Project. She argued that:  
 
Our starting point was that security is an innate human need, and for us to use the 
Internet therefore we have to first feel secure. But that if you turn security on its 
head like that – if you think that is the starting point of security – then a strong 
defense of the rights to freedom of expression and privacy should be at the heart 
of any security policy. 
  
These and other interviewees emphasized a common theme: that good security policy can 
coexist with and even reinforce free speech. As Part I of this paper discussed, many Indian civil 
society organizations have criticized policies that have limited free speech in the name of making 
the Internet a safe place (e.g. the 2008 amendments to the IT Act of 2000, especially sections 66-
69). Some organizations have pointed out that, instead of the blunt ‘pro-security’ approach of 
the 2008 Amendments (and, since then, the government blocking websites that threaten to stir 
up local unrest), there are a nimbler set of options governments could deploy. By censoring 
websites and punishing their creators, the government leaves intact the underlying conditions 
(poverty, inequality, poor governance, corruption, violence) that prompted the offending online 
behavior. Left unchecked, these underlying conditions can lead not just to future offensive 
behavior online, but future insecurity as well. By taking this larger view - that social and economic 
justice can lead to a more secure and safe Internet - governments can end the false binary of 
‘security vs. free speech’ in Internet policymaking. With this type of argument, Indian civil society 
organizations have sought to make ‘security’ a broader and more socially inclusive concept, and 
one that goes beyond the day-to-day security of specific sites or networks.  
 
User Rights 
Many interviewees expressed frustration about the status of users’ rights, which they saw 
primarily as something to be protected from actions by governments, industry, and other actors. 
Interviewees argued that users’ rights needed greater attention and legal status. Rishab Bailey 
spoke for many interviewees when he said:  
 
At the national level, we believe it is essential that we have fair legislation within 
the limits of the Constitution to protect the rights of our citizens. This is required 
urgently, which is why the Marco Civil6 is an excellent example for our government 
                                               
6 The “Marco Civil da Internet” is a civil-rights based framework for the Internet which was signed into law by 
Brazil’s President, Dilma Rousseff, in April 2014, during the NETmundial meeting in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Brazilian 
activists had long fought for this legislation, which has been dubbed the “Internet Constitution.” The law seeks to 
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in terms of having a rights--based framework domestically, and I think we need 
one internationally as well. 
 
Similarly, focusing on the need to curb excessive surveillance, Chinmayi Arun, Research Director 
at the Centre for Communication Governance at the National Law University, advocated policies 
that are rooted in traditional methods for tracking non-cybercrimes. She stated:  
 
The main problem I see with the existent work on cybersecurity is that many 
assume the premise that the only way to identify cybercrime is through 
surveillance... The way to track cybercrime is the same way you track ordinary 
crime – patience in understanding these networks, infiltrating them and earn 
trust, then map out the organization. And so all of that can be done without use 
of many surveillance tools, because cyber criminals are usually pretty 
sophisticated online. 
 
In general, there is preference for developing civil-rights based frameworks that would protect 
user rights in the fight against cyber criminals.  
 
“Users’ rights” as noted by Arun refers to users’ privacy rights, and the right not to be surveilled, 
while protecting the right to information and free speech (and thus the right from censorship). 
While this seems to be a fairly general and well-understood concept, it has particular relevance 
to Indian users, as the Indian government has, time and again, resorted to covert and overt 
surveillance, curbs on free speech (with the accompanying threat of arrests), and censorship, as 
noted in many instances above. These have been accomplished through various laws that have 
at times been pushed through without much discussion or explanation leading to interviewees’ 
preference for developing civil-rights based frameworks. 
 
National Sovereignty and Foreign Influences 
The stakeholders we interviewed were concerned about national sovereignty. Several mentioned 
the Snowden disclosures and fears of surveillance by US and other countries’ intelligence 
agencies. A representative quote comes from Arun:  
 
Unlike China, which has essentially cut itself off from the Internet, India has very 
much hooked onto the Internet. We need the ability to not just protect ourselves 
                                               
reinforce the protection of fundamental freedoms in the digital age, and was developed through a   participatory 
process. However, as the EFF notes, the Marco Civil did not pass “without getting caught in the traditional horse-
trading of the legislative process, which resulted in several concessions. One of the most damaging concessions, 
fiercely opposed by digital rights activists, was a data retention mandate that compels the collection and storage of 
connections logs of any innocent individual.” (Pinho and Rodriguez, 2015). 
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but also to influence global discourse. While we have always pushed our 
government to use open-source solutions, this has a higher stake post the 
Snowden revelations. 
  
Interviewees also raised the related issue of the power exercised by foreign technology giants 
(especially Google and Facebook) on the Indian government. These companies often enjoy a 
place on the Indian government’s delegation at major conferences, such as the World Conference 
on Information Technology (WCIT), but Indian companies rarely enjoy that kind of proximity to 
power. As one anonymous interviewee7 stated: “Even organizations that are supposed to 
represent corporate interests, whether it is FICCI8 or NASSCOM,9 by and large tend to represent 
the certain interests of big American companies.” Some stakeholders we interviewed argued that 
– fair or not – as a developing country, India struggles for legitimacy in the industrialized world. 
As an interviewee explained: 
 
I was frustrated that globally there was this very simple discourse of: the US was 
the harbor of Internet freedom... and on the other hand, you had supposedly 
oppressive states which were always in the developing world. And sometimes it 
made it sound like all developing countries are authoritarian. So it was a very 
simplistic and polarized debate. We felt the concerns of non-authoritarian 
developing countries don't get taken seriously. 
 
Frequently, governments face pressure from international corporations with something to lose 
if new legislation strengthens user rights, or champions local and national alternatives to existing 
dominant players. As Arun argued:  
 
The international big content platforms – the Googles, the Facebooks, the Yahoos 
– are the ones who push back. Initially, their stance had been that since they are 
not Indian companies, [and] especially since content decisions are not made in 
India, they are not obligated to fully follow Indian law. I don't know how long they 
will be able to maintain this position because it is a fairly large market. [Moreover] 
the government has been talking recently about data localization. But typically it 
is the multinational corporations that have pushed back and have argued from 
time to time. 
 
                                               
7 We have included the names of only those interviewees who agreed to have their names released. Others have 
been kept anonymous in this paper.  
8 The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry is an association of business organizations in India. 
9 The National Association of Software and Services Companies is a trade association in India’s IT sector. 
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It should be noted here that foreign companies operating in India are obliged to follow Indian 
law. However, foreign companies can use technical loopholes to circumvent such laws. For 
example, when the mobile telephone vendor Blackberry was ordered by the Indian government 
to provide access to user information, Blackberry claimed that since its secure servers were 
located in Canada, it could not comply with the order. In contrast, an Indian telecom executive 
we interviewed noted that his company generally acceded to government requests. 
 
In interviews, members of civil society seemed to have mixed feelings about sovereignty and 
foreign influences. On the one hand, several were vocal in their opposition to foreign surveillance 
and foreign dominance of the Internet economy. On the other hand, some of these same civil 
society organizations heralded the benefits of international tech companies in opposing (what 
our interviewees saw as) bad domestic policies. In several cases, it was through the international 
multistakeholder process that Indian civil society organizations gained enough prominence to 
attract the attention of the Indian government. In their complicated relationship with 
sovereignty, Indian civil society organizations have internalized some of the tensions between 
‘domestic’ and ‘global’ forces in Internet governance. 
  
Technical Knowledge Deficit  
Among civil society actors, there is increasing recognition that legislators and judges need to 
better understand communication technology. As Mishi Choudhary of the Software Freedom Law 
Centre noted,  
 
…[India’s] democratically elected legislators do not understand [the Internet]. 
Even at the judicial level… the side that explains technology better is the side that 
wins, because judges don’t understand technology. So this is an issue that 
intertwines technology, law, and policy. And this affects and impacts lots of people 
in business, tech and beyond. 
  
This lack of understanding of technical issues sometimes results in conflicting policies. For 
example, this is apparent in some of the Indian government’s attempts at regulating the 
encryption standards used for common Internet communications. Kovaks noted that according 
to Indian regulation, the government has set the “ridiculously low” upper limit of 40-bit key 
length encryption for users (without seeking government permission). This means that, “if you 
use https on your Gmail, you are, strictly speaking, breaking the law” (since https on Gmail uses 
higher bit encryption key-lengths). According to Kovacs, the government specifies low-level 
encryption standards for private communications between citizens “because they want to be 
able to access everybody's data.”  
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There are also other contradictions. As noted by Salman Waris, the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI) prescribes a 64-bit/128-bit encryption for standard network security and 
mandates the use of encryption technology for security, reliability and confidentiality of data. 
SEBI recommends use of secured socket layer security, preferably with 128-bit encryption, for 
securities trading over a mobile phone or a wireless application platform. Thus two different 
encryption standards are being suggested by SEBI and the Reserve Bank, respectively. This is 
likely to cause more confusion in the conduct of Internet based commerce in India. 
 
In their efforts to shape policy outcomes, different stakeholders try to influence public opinion 
through print and digital media and by capitalizing on particular public events. In practice, the 
influence that they exert is amplified when the debate on the issues in question is also taken up 
at a global level. Problems arise when globally debated issues move to the forefront of national 
policy-making bodies, to the detriment of other issues that are important from a local point of 
view. As Arun notes: 
 
When nation-states are talking to each other, the conversation is often only about 
security. While security is important, balance in creating procedures such that we 
do not violate anybody's rights in the quest for security is also important. I do not 
think that has been achieved. So our role is to do whatever we can to make sure 
that is achieved. For example, [concerning] security policy ... the parties discussing 
were not really very mindful of building human rights into it, and making sure the 
procedures are rights- protective.  
 
Arun also noted that push-back by local industry against policies that have human rights impacts 
is negligible. One could conjecture that this could be because of the deep nexus that continues 
to exist between Indian industry and the governmental agencies – remnants of the pre-
liberalization years when the government completely controlled industry, and when the industry 
could only move forward by establishing personal connections or through rent-seeking behavior.  
  
The growth of the Internet in India has created new power dynamics, with the government at 
the center of a national debate about security and rights. In that debate, the arrival of civil society 
has created new alliances based on a complex alignment of interests. What has emerged is not 
simply a process of actors coming together in a concert; instead it is a process of actors funding, 
shaping, interacting with, and seeking to influence each other in a fluid and interactive form of 
governance. In our interviews, we uncovered several aspects of the debate about security and 
rights.  Part of the debate is about definitions and scope (e.g. what constitutes ‘security’); part of 
the debate is about priorities (e.g. users’ rights); part of the debate is about what should be 
national and what should be global; and part of the debate is about technical literacy and the 
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role of expertise in policymaking. In these debates about security and Internet rights, we see that 
governments have retained their roles as agenda-setters, but have been joined in the 
policymaking process by a range of actors. The result is a set of policymaking interactions that 
cross borders, involve alliances among different types of participants, and transcend the 
boundary between ‘domestic’ and ‘global’. 
 
Conclusion 
Today, the multistakeholder model of Internet policy-making is beset with challenges. One such 
challenge is that the various interests involved engage in communication and advocacy efforts 
that cross national borders. More often than not, the interests themselves are shaped by external 
as well as internal events and movements. Social and cultural aspects also come into play. In 
addition, the structural features of the Internet itself constrain regulation. 
  
In our analysis of legislation and policy documents and in our interviews with stakeholders, we 
sought to understand the interactions and power dynamics at work in India’s Internet 
governance. Internet policy-making in India is a complex process involving a mix of stakeholders 
and discussions at the local, national, and global levels. History also plays a major part in how the 
interactions, as well as tensions, have evolved. While global discussions of Internet governance 
have been years in the making, national differences (in laws, practices, user culture, and 
vulnerabilities) continue to persist. By focusing on national governance of a global technology, 
we have learned about the changing power relations that exist in the global multistakeholder 
model, as well as the ways in which discussions at the national and global levels influence each 
other and shape policy outcomes. 
  
Our research shows that the state uses civil society to the extent that it suits the state, and more 
importantly, in order to keep up the appearance of inclusivity. Yet that does not mean that civil 
society is completely powerless. Working in coordination with the free press, civil society has, 
time and again, brought to the forefront issues such as privacy, freedom of expression and access 
to information in the context of the state’s need for security. This became very apparent in the 
March 24, 2015 Indian Supreme Court ruling which declared Section 66A of the Information 
Technology Act unconstitutional (Sriram, 2015). Section 66A banned statements made on the 
Internet that could cause “annoyance,” “inconvenience,” “enmity, hatred or ill-will.” Application 
of this law had resulted in, among others: the arrests of two college girls who had made a 
Facebook posting questioning the government-ordered shutdown in Mumbai due to the death 
of a popular politician; and the arrest of a citizen in Southern India for his Twitter post accusing 
a politician of corruption. Shreya Singhal, a law student, challenged the law’s constitutionality; 
she and was supported in her lawsuit by NGOs such as the People’s Union of Civil Liberty (PUCL), 
the Center for Internet and Society, and the India and the Centre for Communication Governance 
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of the National Law School.  The Supreme Court judgment was a major victory for freedom of 
expression in India, as well as for civil society.  
 
In the game of shifting loyalties and issue-based policy making, industry has occasionally sided 
with civil society in calling for the above-mentioned issues. On other occasions, however, the 
state has held more power over the industry in the way security has been implemented. Overall, 
it is fair to say that while the number of civil society organizations in India is plentiful, only a 
handful of these engage in serious and persistent actions focusing on Internet governance issues. 
These are almost always indigenous organizations that nonetheless are acutely aware of external 
affairs, issues, and challenges.  
 
In fact, the Indian public as well as the Indian government have a deep-seated mistrust of foreign 
organizations and abhor foreign interference—a deep rooted fear that stems India’s colonial 
past. Indian civil society organizations periodically benefit from foreign assistance, but do not 
blindly accept directions from abroad, unless it suits their local interests. These organizations 
have endured numerous shifts in fortune from occasionally antagonistic governments, to 
corporations and vice versa. However, India’s civil society has been surprisingly effective in 
bringing issues to the forefront of Indian society. In this they have been aided by another 
democratic and (mostly) neutral institution—the Fourth Estate. The press and the media have 
managed to remain free of overt government and corporate interference, and in the end, this 
makes the difference as to how effective or ineffective the civil society has been on shaping 
Internet governance in India. 
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